he may obey it out of fear of the consequences or from inertia . . . But this merely personal concern with the rules . . . cannot characterise the attitude of the courts to the rules with which they operate as courts.43 How can Hart say, then, that the internal point of view can be adopted on the basis of 'calculations of long-term interest'?44 As Raz objects, one can comply with a law for self-interested reasons but one cannot adduce one's preferences or one's self interest by themselves as a justification for holding that other people must, or have a duty to act in a certain way. To claim that another has to act in my interest is normally to make a moral claim about his moral obligations.45
Perhaps, though, we are being unfair to Hart. Although he says that the internal point of view may be adopted for reasons of self-interest, he does not say that demands and criticisms which are thereafter made from that point of view express, or depend for their justification upon, those reasons. Perhaps they are reasons to adopt a point of view which is autonomous, in that one's judgments, demands, criticisms and so on have some normative force or sense which does not depend on the reasons which initially induced one to adopt it.46 If so, the normative force or sense of legal demands and criticisms made by those who accept law as authoritative are independent of the reasons which initially motivated their acceptance, whether those reasons were amoral, immoral, or moral. In this respect, it might be argued, the law is like the rules of a game or a club: since demands and criticisms based on these rules are made, understood and accepted as legitimate by all participants, although they may have joined for any number of reasons, the normative force or sense of their demands and criticisms must be independent of those reasons-it must be autonomous and sui generis.
But this leaves the normative force or sense of such demands and criticisms unanalysed and mysterious. Demands and criticisms are usually intended to motivate those to whom they are addressed, and so they should make, or at least be able to make, sense to those people. Demands and criticisms should express or imply the existence of some point-some reason-for acting which is discernible by those to whom they are addressed. This is why, as Raz points out, the self-interest of the speaker does not suffice. Demands that people act otherwise than in accordance with their own self-interest are normally interpreted as moral demands because it is generally assumed that there are good reasons to act morally. But what could be the point-the force or sense-of demands and criticisms whose normativity is sui generis?
Hart would object that this analysis of normative demands and criticisms is cognitivist, whereas his is non-cognitivist in that it does not assume the existence of If they were immoral or amoral they could not fulfil their role of justifying judicial action. Amoral or immoral reasons can justify action to the actor, but they cannot justify it to others, especially not to those likely to be adversely affected by the action. But the role of legal reasoning is to publicly justify judicial action: reasons which the judge addresses only to herself cannot in principle play that role. It is clear from Hart's description of the internal point of view that it involves a commitment to this kind of public reasoning; it expresses itself in demands and criticisms which other members of the relevant social group are expected to accept as legitimate and persuasive.52 So the ultimate norms cannot be amoral or immoral. Nor can they be in some other sense non-moral, pertaining to some quite separate category of norms. Norms which were purely legal, having no extra-legal (eg, moral) normative force, would also fail to justify judicial action. Such norms could not be, as moral norms are usually taken to be,53 self-justifying. A judge whose ultimate justification for acting was a purely legal norm would rightly be regarded as having acted senselessly and incomprehensibly.54 As MacCormick says, this would be justification only in a very Pickwickian sense.55
It might be objected on Hart's behalf that in his view the minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system require merely that its laws be generally obeyed, and that its officials regard its secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication 'as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and each other's deviations as lapses'.56 This implies that it is not necessary for non-officials to adopt the internal point of view towards the law. It might also be thought to imply that it is not necessary for officials to adopt towards non-officials the normative attitudes and language characteristic of the internal point of view. Hart clearly intends the first implication: 'in an extreme case the internal point of view with its characteristic normative use of legal language . . . might be confined to the official world'.57 But it is extremely doubtful that he intends the second implication: if so, he envisages a legal system whose officials claim on its behalf authority over one another, but not over their subjects, whose compliance is secured by naked force. He does, though, refer to cases in which law is used 'to subdue and maintain, in a position of permanent inferiority, a subject group whose size, relatively to the master group, may be large', provided it is much less well-organized and powerful than the master group.58 In such cases, there is 'nothing in the system to command [the subjects'] loyalty but only things to fear',59 which might make it pointless for officials to use normative demands and 52 CL, 54-6, 86-8 and 110-12. 53 Not always, of course. Some believe that compliance with moral norms must be justified in terms other than the norms of morality themselves, for example, in terms of essentially prudential norms. On this view only prudential behaviour is self-justifying. 54 On this see M. J. Detmold's illuminating discussion in ULM, 22-7 and 52-3; D. Lyons, 'Derivability, Defensibility, and the Justification of Judicial Decisions', op cit n 2, 339-42; and AL, 10. 55 N. criticisms, rather than sheer brute force, to induce obedience. If Hart does accept this implausible second implication, the objection made on his behalf would be that (on his view) it is possible for there to be a legal system for which even its officials do not claim moral authority or, indeed, any moral justification.
Whether or not such a legal system has ever existed may be doubted; it would certainly be unlikely to survive for long. It is well known that even in slave societies many slaves have themselves to some extent accepted the legitimacy of their subordinate status. It is unlikely that even the most cynical of ruling castes would make no attempt to induce or sustain such acceptance by claiming moral authority over their subjects. Moreover, as historical experience seems to confirm, the ruling caste is more likely than not to believe its own claims in that regard.60 But even if such cases are possible, at least two replies can be made to this objection on Hart's behalf.
First, our criticism of HIart would still hold even in relation to such an 'extreme case'. Even if the rulers adopt only towards one another the normative attitudes and language characteristic of the internal point of view, this would surely be to express a moral demand for solidarity within the ruling caste in maintaining the legal system. Otherwise it is very difficult-for the reasons already given-to explain their resort to those notions, such as authority, right, obligation and justification, which exemplify the internal point of view.61
The second reply is this. Too much emphasis has been given to Hart's 'two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system', at the expense of his fundamental methodology of the 'central case'. Hart is not greatly interested in defining 'law' or 'legal system'. Although he finds in the combination of primary and secondary rules 'the key to the science of jurisprudence', he is not willing to claim that even this combination is to be found wherever 'law' is properly used.62 He says that 'the diverse range of cases of which the word "law" is used are not linked by any simple uniformity, but by less direct relations ... to a central case'.63 By analysing the central case, Hart hopes to resolve the major questions which have perplexed legal philosophers, concerning the resemblances and differences between law, coercion and morality.64 Resolving doubts about the proper classification of borderline cases is only a secondary concern.
It seems that Hart's 'central case' should contain those features which are common to 'the clear standard cases constituted by the legal systems of modern states'.65 It is these features which make up 'the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system', which Hart sets out to analyse. This is confirmed by Hart's oft repeated references to the following patterns of thought which must be explained in an adequate account of law, but which are not adequately explained by Austinian theory. First, there is the claim to authority which is made by legal officials, and which distinguishes laws from orders backed merely by threats.68 The secondary rules of a legal system purport to confer on officials the right to rule, which makes it right to obey them.69 This is why someone legally required to act is said to have an obligation, and not just to be obliged by a threat, to act.70 (And note that obligations are said to exist when imposed by rules 'believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social life or some highly prized feature of it'.71) Moreover, it explains why citizens are expected to, and usually do, comply with the law for reasons independent of threatened sanctions-its practical guidance in this manner being the 'primary' or 'principal' function of law, and its imposition of sanctions a result of the 'breakdown or failure' of that function.72 These patterns of thought, which pervade all 'mature' legal systems, are unquestionably among those phenomena which have inspired the puzzling philosophical questions with which Hart is concerned. It has been argued here that they are best explained as patterns of moral thought. To ignore them on the ground that the minimum sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a legal system do not require that non-officials be included within them, either as participants or as subjects, the latter claim being dubious anyway in the context of Hart's own theory, is to mistake one of Hart's secondary interests (the classification of borderline cases) for his primary interest in elucidating the inter-relationships between law, coercion and morality in the central case. To focus on very unusual and extreme borderline cases in analysing those inter-relationships must lead to distortion. 
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Hart's response to criticism along these lines is surprisingly weak. First, he says that the settled practice of judges is to enforce laws regardless of their view of those laws' moral value.73 But obviously they would claim, and generally believe, that doing this is morally justified (or even required).74 It is a commonplace that it may be morally right to enforce laws which, in themselves, are morally bad; indeed, the efficacy of law depends on this being widely understood and accepted.75 Secondly, Hart says that such criticism depends on a cognitive account of objective reasons for action, to which moral and legal statements both refer, as opposed to his own non-cognitive account of legal statements. This response has already been discussed.76
Hart's defence of the semantic thesis in terms of non-moral normativity therefore fails. Can positivism survive the admission that internal legal statements express moral commitment to law? According to Raz, the fundamental positivist thesis is the social thesis,77 and he believes that it can stand independently of the semantic thesis.
Raz's Theory of Morally Committed Positivism
Raz persuasively argues that it is part of the very concept of law that legal officials claim authority for the rules they enact and enforce.78 He says that this claim is manifested by the fact that legal institutions are officially designated as 'authorities', by the fact that they regard themselves as having the right to impose obligations on their subjects, by their claims that their subjects owe them allegiance, and that their subjects ought to obey the law as it requires to be obeyed.79
According to Raz something is authoritative in practical matters only if it constitutes a special sort of reason for action, a reason for action which excludes at least some of the reasons against action.80 When there are ordinary reasons for and against a certain action, an all-things-considered practical judgment depends on their relative weight. But truly authoritative norms are not to be weighed along with all other relevant reasons for and against action; that they are authoritative is a reason to exclude at least some of the competing reasons. But to say this is to say that a truly authoritative norm imposes an obligation to act regardless of the existence of those competing reasons.81 As we have seen, Raz also argues that this is to make a moral claim.82 Now, Raz also argues that in claiming that the law is authoritative, legal officials must understand what they are claiming-they must know what authority is.83 In making this claim they are therefore quite deliberately claiming that those to whom the law applies have a moral obligation to obey it. Finally, Raz argues not only that the claim must be made, but that it will normally be made sincerely.84
Raz also advocates the pure fact social thesis, which maintains that the identification of law depends solely on facts about human behaviour and intentions. In its defence he argues that this thesis is embedded in the conception of law which we happen, for good reason, to have. In The Authority of Law he appeals first to our linguistic practices-inter-related distinctions we draw between legal skill and moral wisdom, between applying law and developing it, and between settled and unsettled law85-and secondly to the value or function of law, which explains and justifies those distinctions. An essential function of law is to provide rules which can be identified objectively, and accepted as the basis for the co-ordination of social life, despite substantive moral disagreement. It can do so only if it can be identified by 'publicly ascertainable standards not involving moral argument'.86 In a more recent article, this function argument is couched in terms of the claim to be authoritative which, as we have just seen,87 he takes to be part of law's essence. He calls his analysis of authority the 'service' conception of authority: authority is justified because it helps people do what they ought to do, by obviating the need for them to rely on their own more fallible judgments on the matter. But for this to be possible, subjects must be able to identify the authority's directives without themselves having to consider what they ought to do; otherwise, the directives would be redundant. But this is to say that the pure fact social thesis must apply.88
Although the identification of law must depend solely on social facts, Raz argues that internal legal statements express moral commitment. Raz's current view seems to be that in internal legal statements 'valid' is used to express a moral judgment. In The Authority of Law Raz expressly adopts 'the natural law view on the meaning of "validity": the view "that a valid rule" means a justified one, a rule that one is justified, indeed required, to observe and endorse'.89 Claiming to follow Kelsen,90 he also says that 'a legally valid rule is one which has the normative effects (in law) 83 Thus, Raz depicts law as a system of norms whose identification is purely a matter of fact, but which those adopting the internal point of view accept as morally binding on themselves and others subject to them. In this way he reconciles the two aspects of law-the factual and the normative-described at the beginning of this paper. But how can this be so: how can the validity of law be (partly) a matter of moral bindingness, if the identification of law depends purely on social facts, which it must do if the pure fact social thesis is correct? If norms whose existence is a matter of social facts alone are thought always to give rise to genuine moral rights and duties, those social facts must be thought to possess some necessary and not merely contingent moral value. (Which is to say that from the internal point of view the positivists' moral thesis is false.) Raz's solution turns on the notion of 'systemic' validity: the moral bindingness of law primarily depends not on the merits of each individual legal rule, but on the community's need for an effective system of authoritative rules. Since he regards law as authoritative only if it can be identified and interpreted without reference to moral criteria, that is, on the basis of certain social facts alone, and because legal authority is morally valuable, those social facts possess moral value. An individual rule is morally binding-that is, ought to be obeyed-'because it is part of a legal system which is in force in the country concerned . 
The Foundational Thesis
It might seem that, for Raz, the role of moral judgment in legal reasoning is properly limited to a once-and-for-all judgment of systemic validity, which justifies the decision to treat all the positive norms of the legal system as authoritative, so that legal reasoning can thereafter proceed without further reference to moral values.98 This is just what treating the law as authoritative involves, and this (we will assume for now) can be morally justified. This rather crude thesis about legal reasoning we will call the 'crude foundational thesis'. As MacCormick puts it (although neither he nor Raz would endorse the thesis in this crude form), Lawyers are hired to argue cases at law, and judges are appointed to resolve legal cases. Neither would welcome (or, one would suppose, be much good at fulfilling) a duty to deal in terms of raw moral argumentation as part of their professional or official role. This limitation of lawyerly and judicial skills and tasks is not however a morally disgraceful one . . . a moral norm for the determination of the case. While all agree that there are hard cases, there is some disagreement-which need not concern us-as to whether or not all these kinds of hard case really exist.107 It follows that legal reasoning cannot eschew direct reliance on moral norms because in hard cases decisions cannot be based on positive legal norms alone. In hard cases the crude foundational thesis must be rejected. But this necessitates only a relatively minor amendment to that thesis. The thesis, it might be thought, remains true of most legal questions-including most of those over which litigation is never contemplated, as well as 'easy' cases in the courtsbecause the law can be applied without moral judgments being needed to resolve gaps, inconsistencies or ambiguities. The foundational thesis might be amended to assert that in relation to these 'easy' questions moral judgment in legal reasoning should be confined to the single, foundational judgment of the law's moral bindingness. In what follows this is what will be meant by 'the foundational thesis'.
The foundational thesis must be distinguished from the social thesis. The latter concerns the identification of law, while the former concerns the reasoning which justifies legal decisions, and asserts that in easy cases such reasoning should be restricted to the application of law identified in accordance with the social thesis. To use a distinction recently drawn by Raz, the social thesis is part of a positivist theory of law, whereas the foundational thesis is part of a theory of adjudication, which-he frankly concedes-must be a moral theory because 'the question of which considerations courts should rely upon . . . is clearly a question of political morality'.108 If judges should sometimes decide 'easy' questions for reasons independent of or even contrary to law, the foundational thesis is false although the social thesis may still be true. The social thesis-indeed, the pure fact social thesis-must be true for the foundational thesis to be true, but not vice versa.
But although these theses must be distinguished, and it is the social thesis which he defends, Raz seems committed to the foundational thesis as well. As we have seen, the social thesis rests on claims he makes about an essential function of law and of authority more generally: to enable conduct to be guided by, and disputes to be settled according to, standards which can be identified without moral judgments having to be made.'09 But this surely requires that the standards be not just identified, but also applied, without argument as to their moral merit. It would be pointless to insist on identifying them in this way, but then to make their application in every case subject to moral debate and judgment. The point of an authoritative ruling is to terminate deliberation: in Raz's words, if considerations are authoritatively binding 'those subject to them are not, normally, allowed, by the social institution concerned, to challenge or query their validity or conclusiveness'.l10 If the social thesis is justified by law's authoritativeness, then so too is the foundational thesis. Conversely, if good reasons are found for rejecting the foundational thesis, they will also impugn the social thesis.
The significance of the foundational thesis clearly depends on the extent to which legal questions are 'easy'. If, as some have argued, all legal questions are hard-in the sense that a moral judgment, in addition to the foundational judgment of systemic validity, is needed in order to resolve them-the thesis is worthless.
The Common Law
If the foundational thesis applies to common law reasoning, there must be common law norms which can be identified and applied without moral judgments having to be made. There are two objections to this.
The first objection attacks the social thesis which, as we have seen, the foundational thesis depends on. It is that the norms of the common, law (called rationes decidendi) can rarely, or never, be identified without moral judgments being made. Two reasons have been given for this. First, some argue that the very nature of rationes decidendi is controversial; because theories as to what a ratio is differ in critical respects, the fundamental common law rule that they are binding is itself ambiguous. Alternatively or in addition, the application of these theories in concrete cases is fraught with uncertainty. Consequently, every case at common law is a hard case requiring a moral judgment as to what in earlier cases ought to be regarded as binding (ie, what meaning ought to be given to the term 'ratio decidendi', and what in any particular case ought to be taken to constitute it).111 Secondly, others argue that a ratio decidendi is, at least in part, intrinsically normative rather than factual: the ratio of a previous decision is the norm which provides the morally soundest justification for the decision, rather than the norm stated in the judgment or actually relied on by the judge. The Self-Desttrction of Legal Positivism Both versions of the first objection are of course debatable, but we need not enter into this here, because the foundational thesis is confronted by a second, decisive objection. That is that even if the identification of rationes decidendi does not require any moral judgment, their application does. Let us adopt for the sake of argument a positivist definition of 'ratio decidendi', for example, as the universalization of whatever reasons in fact persuaded a court to make its decision-the identification of those reasons being a matter of fact, for which the court's published reasons for judgment provide evidence, rather than an exercise requiring substantive moral judgment.113 One problem is that, once a ratio is found, the question of its application to the case at hand arises, and this involves deciding whether or not this case should be distinguished. A case is distinguished if it is held to include a fact which was not present in the precedent and which requires a decision different from that which would follow from applying the ratio.14 Necessarily this issue is not governed by a positive legal norm (the only potentially relevant ones are the very rationes whose applicability is in question): its resolution therefore requires moral judgment. Now, it is impossible that any two cases could ever have identical facts: when the applicability of a ratio is in issue, therefore, a court always has before it at least one fact (actually, of course, a multitude of facts) which was not present in the precedent. In order to decide whether or not to apply the ratio, the court must as a matter of logic decide whether this fact calls for a different result and that decision requires moral judgment. A moral judgment must therefore be made in every case at common law, even if it is made sub silentio.
The courts' power to distinguish can be characterized in quite different ways. According to Raz, it is a power to change the law, by modifying a ratio which did purport to apply to the case so that it no longer does so.115 On the other hand, Michael Moore argues that a ratio which is distinguished is found never to have applied to the case at hand, regardless of the terms in which it may have been framed in the precedent itself.116 Moore's view entails that any formulation of a ratio is necessarily 'incomplete'; that a ratio is an essentially moral norm which any judicial formulation can never hope fully to capture.117 This is inconsistent with the positivist conception of rationes decidendi which we adopted for the sake of argument: it is the second version of the first objection. But however the point is put-whether in terms of the identification of rationes, or of their application-it seems indisputable that common law norms can never be applied without moral judgments being made.
Problems for the foundational thesis do not end here, however. The highest court in the judicial hierarchy usually has the power to over-rule as well as to distinguish rationes, and whether or not it should exercise this power is also necessarily a matter for moral judgment.'18 While the power to over-rule must be limited by the requirement that the reason for exercising it must possess a certain strength or weight, there is no plausible way of limiting it to certain kinds of reasons. Everything normally relevant in moral decision-making, as well as the special considerations which support adherence to precedent, must be taken into account by any court deciding whether or not to over-rule."19 Since over-ruling is always a possibility, the highest court must make that decision in every case coming before it, even if it is made sub silentio.
It must be emphasized that this does not directly undermine either the pure fact or the fact dependent social thesis. According to the former, the existence and content of the law can be identified by reference to social facts alone; but Raz might concede that whether or not the law, having been ascertained in this fashion, ought to be applied is a moral question requiring separate treatment. The social thesis is part of the positivist theory of law, rather than a theory of adjudication which is a moral theory concerned with the question of which considerations courts should rely upon.120 Now, according to Raz the law often requires judges to make moral judgments. This is consistent with the pure fact social thesis because, although judges are legally bound to make such judgments, they do so on the basis of extra-legal considerations: source-based law itself requires them to go beyond it.121 In the case of common law, Raz might say, the law itself requires judges in every case to decide whether rationes decidendi morally ought to be applied: but this does not mean that what the law is depends in any way on moral considerations-it means that the law confers on judges a residual discretion, potentially exercisable in every case, to change the law. 122 But whether or not the social thesis remains secure, this would be to concede that the foundational thesis is inapplicable to the common law. It is simply not the case that courts regard rationes decidendi as norms to be identified and applied without the making of moral judgments, apart from a once-and-for-all foundational 
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VOL. 10 judgment that doing so is justified. Even if they can be identified in this way, their application depends in every case on their not being distinguished or over-ruled. It is beside the point that it is often, or even usually, so obvious that this should not happen, that the question is not discussed or even adverted to. These are 'easy' cases at common law, but only in the sense that they are morally easy, not in the sense that moral judgment is unnecessary. The common law is a dynamic, continually evolving body of moral judgments, in which nothing is immune from revision or repudiation, which are used to guide, but not to supersede, moral judgments in the present.
Perhaps Raz would accept this. He has criticized the 'classical image' of the judge-as simply identifying the law, determining the facts, and applying the law to the facts-as misleading. 'The courts', he says, 'carry with them both their functions of applying pre-existing law and of making new ones into almost all cases (I do not mean that they almost always make new laws, only that almost always they have to consider whether to do so)'.123 But if the law itself requires that common law rules never be applied without a decision first being made as to whether or not they ought to be changed (by being distinguished or over-ruled), it would appear that no decision is ever required by the common law. only'. But it is far from clear that this is how common law has been conceived of by lawyers and judges over the centuries. As a descriptive theory of the concept of law Raz's position is thus problematic. (Note that it is the pure fact, not the fact dependent, social thesis which leads to this result: the thesis that 'the law' cannot include moral principles, such as those governing the power to distinguish and over-rule, even if they are both uncontroversial and required to be applied by legal norms.)
Raz may be in even worse trouble than this, however. As we have seen, he argues that legal officials necessarily, and usually sincerely, claim that law is authoritative, and that if that claim is not made for a body of norms then they cannot be law. To claim that norms are authoritative is to claim that they should be identified and applied in accordance with the social and foundational theses, which is to say, without moral judgments being made.'28 But it seems to be the case that common law judges do not regard rationes as having to be applied regardless of the moral justification of doing so. It follows from Raz's theory of law and authority that these judges do not claim that rationes are authoritative, and that therefore what we call common law is not really law.129 Something is badly amiss.
The Interpretation of Statutes
At first blush, the social and foundational theses seem better suited to statute than to common law. It must surely be possible for judges to identify and apply statutes regardless of their own moral and political views, because considerations of democracy and institutional competence support the widely held opinion that this is what they ought to do, and 'ought' implies 'can'. Those considerations, one might think, help to justify the once-and-for-all foundational judgment that statutory norms are binding, which enables legal reasoning to proceed without further reference to morality-at least, apart from those relatively rare 'hard' cases where statutes are ambiguous or inconsistent, or themselves require the making of moral judgments. However, even here it is possible to raise objections similar to those we have just canvassed in the case of the common law.
Notoriously, many different considerations compete for priority in the interpretation of statutes: they include the meanings of words, the legislature's intentions, compatibility with other parts of the law, the expectations of citizens, and substantive justice. In any case in which they compete, there are good reasons for taking each into account; which should prevail must depend on an overall moral judgment of their relative weights in the particular circumstances of that case. 
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Common law principles and maxims assist the making of such judgments, but they are flexible and defeasible; even if they can be construed as rules,131 we have just seen that common law rules cannot be applied without a moral judgment-whether or not to distinguish-first being made.132 Now, for the foundational thesis to have any significance, most cases involving statutes must be easy, not requiring any such moral judgment. This would be the case only if (a) either one, or some combination, of the non-moral considerations have absolute priority over moral considerations, obviating the need to make any moral judgment in cases in which it, or they, are available, and (b) in most, but admittedly not all, cases these decisive non-moral considerations are available. For example, it might be argued that if the natural meaning of statutory words is unambiguous the question of interpretation is settled, no other matter needing to be considered, and that this is so in most cases.
Michael Moore has recently discussed the propriety of a court ignoring clear statutory words.'33 There are cases in which the application of a statutory provision, in strict accordance with the clear meaning of its terms, will produce an absurd or very unjust result, which the legislature can be assumed not to have intended; in such cases, the courts will usually refuse to give that meaning to the provision, holding that the law does not require this.134 It cannot seriously be argued either that the courts do not do this, or that in so doing they act wrongly (morally or legally).
There is some similarity between the courts' power to do this, and their power to distinguish or over-rule established common law rules. In both cases quite different accounts of what a court does in exercising its power might be offered. Here, one possible positivist account is that the court has a limited power to change statutes, a power conferred by a legal norm which authorizes the courts to consider extra-legal norms (eg, justice and fairness) in exercising it.135 An alternative account is that the court simply finds the true meaning of the statute: a statutory norm somehow lies 'behind' the statutory text, which may sometimes fail to give accurate expression to it.136 On this view, the text of the statute is merely defeasible evidence of what the statute 'really' requires, and so the court is not changing the statute but applying it. Again, for our purposes it does not matter which of these accounts-that the court is changing, or that it is applying, the 131 J. Bell denies this in id, 292-3. 132 For these reasons, inter alia, Raz undermines the social thesis (which here he calls the sources thesis) when he acknowledges that it 'is essential to the sources thesis that the character of the rules of interpretation prevailing in any legal system, ie, the character of the rules for imputing intentions and directives to the legal authorities, is a matter of fact and not a moral issue'. (ALM, 318.) Apart from the fact that the courts sometimes refuse to interpret legislation in accordance with the legislature's intentions, there are probably no rules of interpretation which can be applied-even if they can be identified and themselves interpreted-without moral judgments being imsade. 133 If sound, this argument vitiates the foundational thesis, by demonstrating that in questions of statutory as well as common law, legal reasoning necessarily includes the making of moral judgments even in 'easy' cases-or, rather, that there are no easy cases. Of course, even if the foundational thesis is discredited, the pure fact social thesis can still be defended. As we have seen, Raz might attribute to the courts a limited power to change statutory law: on this view what is law is still a matter purely of fact, even if in every case the courts are legally required to consider whether or not it ought to be changed rather than simply applied. But this is the same strategy which, in relation to common law, proved to be highly problematic.139 Given Raz's own premises, it seems to entail the following: that the law does not require any particular decision, that it has prima facie force only, that therefore it does not claim to be authoritative, and (absurdly) that therefore it is not law.
However, the foundational thesis can be defended on the ground that the judgments which Moore says are necessary in every case are not really moral judgments as such, but judgments as to the most likely intention of the legislature. In other words, although the courts are sometimes justified in setting aside the natural meaning of statutory words, this is only when palpable absurdity or injustice shows that meaning to be unintended; if it is clear that the legislature did intend it, the courts must accept it. Blackstone, for example, said that if a statute would otherwise lead to 'absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason . . . the judges are in decency to conclude that the consequence was not foreseen by Parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to . . . quoad hoc disregard it'. On the other hand, he asserted, 'if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it'.140 On this view, the primary question is really Moral judgments are relevant in helping to resolve that factual question, but only in so far as the court's moral sensibility can be assumed to resemble that of the legislature. Strictly speaking, the court need not at this stage make a committed moral judgment at all: it must attempt to simulate that which the legislature would make. A moral judgment is needed only if it concludes that the natural meaning of the words does not accord with the legislature's intentions, in which case it must decide which ought to have priority. Since it can also be plausibly argued that in most cases the natural meaning of statutory words does reflect the intentions of the legislature, that moral judgment will rarely be required, and so the foundational thesis remains valid and significant.
But whether or not this defence succeeds, there are other grounds for doubting the applicability of the positivist social thesis to statutory law. If they are sound, the foundational thesis, as well as the social thesis, may yet be doomed.
The Validity of Statutes
According to the positivist defence just discussed, effect must be given to clear statutory words evincing an unambiguous legislative purpose which is extremely unjust, provided only that it does not violate any express constitutional norms. But is this so? The positivist may be right to this extent: that such injustice cannot be avoided by interpretation, because there is no plausible construction of the statute's meaning other than the one intended. But perhaps the question is one of validity: are all statutes, duly enacted in accordance with express constitutional norms, necessarily valid?.
The social thesis seems to require an affirmative answer to this question. If statutory law is identifiable ultimately by reference to social facts alone, how can the validity of a statute depend even partly on whether or not it violates principles of justice, apart from those incorporated in express constitutional provisions? But this is problematic if valid means morally binding, as Raz suggests it does and as it must if reductivism is to be avoided. Raz's solution is what, in a more general form, we have called the foundational thesis: that moral bindingness can be established by social facts alone, provided that a once-and-for-all judgment of systemic validity is justified.141 Unfortunately for Raz and the social thesis, this solution seems to fail.
One problem is that, even if the foundational thesis is sound, this 'solution' does not really save the social thesis. It depends on distinguishing between the identification of law and judgments about legal validity, the former depending purely on social facts (membership and enforceability) and the latter only partly on those facts. He says: But surely no such distinction is possible. As Raz himself says, a law which is not valid is not a law, and vice versa,143 and so to say that validity depends partly on moral criteria is surely to say that the identification of law depends partly on moral criteria-which contradicts the social thesis-even if those criteria can be simply assumed to hold as the foundational thesis maintains.144 The difficulty cannot be escaped by shifting from the pure fact social thesis to the fact dependent social thesis. According to the latter, moral criteria may be relevant to the identification of law but only if social facts (contingent official practices) make them relevant. But if legal validity consists of genuine moral bindingness, it cannot depend on moral criteria which owe their relevance entirely to social facts: to argue the contrary would be to argue that genuine moral judgment can depend ultimately on facts alone, which would violate the Humean dichotomy between facts and values. Indeed, the fact dependent social thesis, when used in this context, seems to invert the true relationship.'45 As Raz's argument makes clear, moral values make relevant the facts of system membership and enforceability, not vice versa. These considerations suggest that there may be a fundamental and irresolvable incompatibility between the social thesis, in both its versions, and any attempt to abandon the positivists' semantic thesis. If it is part of the meaning of internal legal statements to express genuine moral judgment, they cannot be based wholly or ultimately on social facts alone. 23, 25, 68-9; PRN, 155) . Furthermore, he says that rules are 'complete' reasons for action, reasons for which there may be other reasons but which provide a full justification for action without reference to those other reasons (PRN, 22-5 and 78-80). Could this be Raz's response to the points raised in the text?: that although there must be underlying reasons for law constituting a reason for action, law is, cotnsidered by itself, a complete reason for action. The problem is that, in speaking of facts as reasons for action, Raz is not referring to empirical facts but is 'using the term "fact" in an extended sense to designate that in virtue of which true or justified statements are true or justified . . . A fact is that of which we talk when making a statement by the use of sentences of the form "it is a fact that . . ." In this sense facts are not contrasted with values, but include them ("It is a fact that human life is the supreme value").' (PRN, 17-18.) In saying that a rule is a fact which is a 'complete reason' for action, Raz means a valid rule (he says elsewhere that 'an invalid rule is not a rule at all': AL, 146). Thus a rule is a 'fact' which constitutes a complete reason for action in the 'extended sense' of 'fact' which in this case includes the essentially normative quality of 'validity' which, as pointed out in the text, is ultimately grounded in morals rather thans empirical facts. So law is a complete reason for actions only if 'law' means 'valid law' and, as Raz acknowledges, validity is snot a matter of empirical fact. upon'.147 On the other hand, the identification of law must be part of a theory of law. But if judgments of identification and judgments of validity are one and the same, or even if they are just necessarily congruent, then the correct theory of law and (the relevant parts of148) the correct theory of adjudication must be isomorphic. The theory of law must identify as law just those norms whose application is morally justified by the moral theory of adjudication. But how could this be unless both theories are one and the same, and the theory of law, therefore, is a moral theory?
If, as Raz seems to concede, the test for validity and the test for identification must concur, it is highly implausible that the latter could be based on social facts alone. How could the moral bindingness of law be guaranteed by any set of social facts alone? Surely whatever social facts, in the real world, are taken to establish which rules are law, there can be no absolute assurance that such rules will be morally binding-or, that is, valid.149 The qualification 'in the real world' is needed because in an ideal world the law could be whatever a morally infallible legislator enacted: the law would be whatever the legislator in fact enacted, but its moral bindingness would be guaranteed. The point is that in the real world there are no morally infallible legislators. It must always be possible for rules selected solely on the basis of social facts to be not merely morally bad (as we saw when considering Hart, morally bad laws may still be morally binding), but so morally bad that they morally ought not to be obeyed. And this shows that a once-and-forall foundational judgment of systemic validity can never be justified, which vitiates the foundational thesis.
An excellent illustration of this difficulty is the common law doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, usually said to be the most fundamental rule of British constitutional law. According to this doctrine, supported by Blackstone and entrenched as orthodoxy in British constitutional thought by Dicey,150 the British Parliament possesses absolute sovereignty: it can make or unmake any law whatsoever, and no court can hold any of its enactments-no matter how undemocratic or evil-to be invalid. As Leslie Stephen said in a notorious passage quoted approvingly by Dicey, 'if a legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal '.151 This is a doctrine tailor made for legal positivism. The identification of statutory law depends purely on social facts: what Parliament has in fact enacted. If common law and custom could also be shown to depend on social facts, a positivist account of British law would be complete. But now consider Raz's suggestion that to assert the validity of a law is, in part, to assert its moral bindingness. Could one reasonably assert that whatever Parliament enacts-no matter how undemocratic or There must be reasons justifying submission to any practical authority, reasons which simply could not justify submission whatever the authority directs. A practical authority is necessarily subject to jurisdictional limits set by those underlying reasons. Raz often acknowledges this,158 and his own account of authority entails at least two jurisdictional limits: an authority's directives must express its views as to how its subjects ought to act, and those views must be more likely to be correct than its subjects' views. If a particular directive is manifestly unreasonable, it must be concluded either that it does not express the authority's sincere view of how its subjects ought to act, or that notwithstanding the authority's generally superior competence in practical reasoning, it has in this instance made an egregious error. In either case, the directive cannot be authoritative (although there may be some other contingent reason for complying with it).
The upshot is that neither the foundational thesis nor the social thesis is justified: as for the former, a foundational judgment can at best establish a defeasible presumption that the directives of an authority ought to be obeyed; and as for the latter, whether or not that presumption stands, and so whether or not the directives are valid and therefore to be deemed law, depends on moral judgments. The social thesis must be true of the detached and external points of view only.
It might be objected that, even if authority is limited, this must be compatible with the social and the foundational theses. The jurisdictional limits to authority must be ascertainable without moral judgments having to be made, because otherwise there could be no authority: if in every case it must be decided whether or not an authority has acted intra vires, and if that decision depends on a moral judgment, then the authority is illusory and its directives useless. In every case subjects would have to rely on just those fallible practical judgments which according to Raz's 'service' conception the authority's directives are supposed to pre-empt.
Raz wrestles with this problem. He says that even if authority is limited by the condition that its directives must not be clearly wrong-as to which he expresses no opinion-'establishing that something is clearly wrong does not require going through the underlying reasoning'. For example, it may be clear that thirty numbers have been added incorrectly, without recalculating and arriving at the correct sum, 'as when the sum is an integer whereas one and only one of the added numbers is a fraction'.159 In the case of a practical authority, the implication seems to be that, although it is more likely to be right than its subjects, it may make clear mistakes which they can detect without relying on their own less reliable reasoning abilities (which would be unreasonable).
But this saves neither the social nor the foundational thesis. The judgment that an integer cannot be the sum of other numbers only one of which is a fraction is an arithmetical judgment, based on knowledge of arithmetical laws. Similarly, the judgment that a directive of a practical authority is clearly wrong is a moral judgment. The practical authority of directives cannot be fully established by a once-and-for-all foundational judgment. A foundational judgment can establish a presumption only, the authority of every particular directive still depending on the further moral judgment that it is not clearly so wrong that it ought to be disobeyed.
Raz is right to argue that the authority of law depends on certain kinds of individual moral judgments being pre-empted, but not in the wholesale fashion suggested by the social and the foundational theses. It is not that questions requiring individual moral judgments are wholly displaced by factual questions concerned with the decisions taken by authorities. Rather, while difficult moral questions are displaced by such factual questions, the latter remain subject to deeper moral questions which are easier, or at least less controversial, than those displaced. These easier questions concern the jurisdictional limits of legal authority. That they are easier, or less controversial, is shown by the fact that disagreements as to the merits of statutes are much more common than disagreements as to whether or not they should be obeyed: the latter arise only in a very small sub-class of the former. Indeed, these questions are so much easier, or less controversial, that their answers are usually so obvious that they are not discussed or even adverted to. This shows that easy cases are morally easy, not that moral judgment is unnecessary.
Is Raz right to suggest that the need to make these judgments does not undermine the authority of law? He suggests that when a directive is clearly wrong, this can be established without subjects having to rely on their more fallible reasoning abilities, and so legal authority in other cases will not be disturbed. This may be too optimistic. If it is believed that rules need not be obeyed if they are clearly wrong, there will be disagreement as to what constitutes clear error. Mistakes will inevitably be made, sometimes causing directives which ought to be obeyed to be disobeyed, and at other times vice versa. In a reasonably enlightened community, this should not seriously threaten the authority of law in general, although it would no doubt be somewhat less complete than the lawmakers might desire. But if even a small number of the lawmakers' directives were rejected by the judges, without express constitutional authority, more serious repercussions might ensue, damaging the very structure of the legal system. It may be for reasons such as these that lawmakers claim, at least according to Raz, more authority than they can really be entitled to. Doctrines such as that of the absolute sovereignty of the British Parliament may be explained in this way: as exaggerations-'noble lies', perhaps-which help to prevent any erosion of the authority of law by concealing its real limits.160
Whether such exaggerations are justified is obscure, because it is difficult to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of both the risk they attempt to minimize (insufficient deference to authority) and the risk they pose (excessive deference to authority). But even if they are justified, which seems dubious, they are still exaggerations-at best useful fictions, just like (some would argue) the existence of 160 See n 182 and accompanying text, below.
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God or the objectivity of morality. While the fiction may serve a useful function, as long as lawmakers do not enact very evil statutes, its continued maintenance would be hard to justify if they did. In a sufficiently extreme case, we should hope that the true scope and limits of the authority of law would be clearly recognized. 161 When Raz's theory is developed along these lines it is tempting to conclude that, from the internal point of view, evil laws must be deemed invalid. But we must be cautious here; in particular, the distinction between the internal and detached points of view must be kept in mind. If only a single judge believes a rule to be so evil that it morally ought not be obeyed, should he say it is invalid, that it is not law? Although the preceding discussion may seem to suggest this, there is a stumbling block. If the legal system is efficacious, and all its officials other than that judge believe the rule to be morally binding, it appears from their point of view to be valid and it will be enforced. Surely for the single judge to declare that it is not law is not just futile, but misleading and indeed false.
The law is, in Raz's terms, 'an institutionalized normative system'.162 Laws are norms which 'have the characteristic of being part of a system of norms united by its relation to legal institutions'.163 Therefore, he argues, 'it is ... reasonable to take the law to consist of those norms, rules, and principles, that are presented to individuals and institutions as guides to their behaviour by the body of legal institutions as a whole'.164 Law is necessarily the product of the collective, public reasoning of a body of officials: without a large measure of agreement among them as to the criteria of validity there could be no legal system.165 And as Postema argues,
[s]ince self-identified participants would not be indifferent to the conditions necessary for achieving and maintaining 'the characteristic unity and continuity' of their legal practice, they would regard the fact that the criteria are widely accepted and practiced as an essential part of their argument for the authority of those criteria.166
On taking office, a judge joins a social practice in which institutions and norms have been established by the collective endeavours of the other, past and present, participants.'67 In swearing allegiance to the law, the judge swears allegiance to those institutions and norms, rather than to whatever set of norms he finds personally most congenial. This suggests that, unless his purpose is to confuse and disrupt the legal system, the single judge who is unable to agree with other judges and officials should nevertheless say that the rule is law, because it is valid from their point of view although not from his own. In other words, although he cannot conscientiously make an internal statement that the rule is valid, he should not say that it is therefore invalid; rather, he can and should make a detached statement that 161 Dworkin has argued that official consensus as to the criteria of legal validity arises out of 'independent conviction' rather than mere conformity to convention: officials endorse the same criteria, but principally because they each believe, independently of one another's beliefs, that those criteria morally ought to be followed.'71 But Postema persuasively argues that officials must regard as 'an essential part of the case to be made for the criteria [of validity] . . . the fact that they jointly accept the criteria, or could come to accept them after reflection and participation in a forum in which reasoned and principled arguments are exchanged amongst equals'.172 Nevertheless, he agrees that consensus alone is insufficient: the officials' joint acceptance of a set of criteria of legal validity 'must be linked to more general moral-political concerns'.173 This is because 'if appeals to existing law are to justify judicial decisions and exercises of coercive power, they must rest on something morally more substantial than the mere fact that others follow the rules '.174 This complex amalgamation of moral principle and convention which, as Postema suggests, lies at the foundation of a legal system, is not accurately depicted by the fact dependent social thesis. If legal validity consists of genuine moral bindingness, it cannot depend on moral criteria which owe their relevance entirely to social facts: to argue the contrary would be to argue that genuine moral judgment can depend ultimately on facts alone, which would violate the Humean dichotomy between facts and values.175 Indeed, the positivist puts the cart before the horse. From the internal point of view, moral principles are relevant not just because and in so far as there is official consensus; rather, official consensus is relevant only because of deeper moral principles, which recommend allegiance to an effective system of government, one which possesses or has a good chance of acquiring de facto authority, rather than the futile advocacy of worthy but unpopular moral ideals. 
WINTER 1990
The amalgamation of moral principle and convention at the foundation of law is illuminated by the increasingly popular conception of law as an interpretive social practice.176 Such a practice is constituted not by unreflective conformity to rigidly defined rules; rather, it is assumed to have purposes or values which cannot in principle be fully attained through strict compliance with formulated rules. The infinite variety of situations which can arise must inevitably defeat any attempt by rule-makers to prescribe comprehensively in advance which actions will best serve such purposes or values. Moreover, the perceived purposes and values of a social practice are themselves likely to evolve as new situations and demands force participants to reconsider them. Reflective participants who seek a better understanding of these purposes and values, both for the sake of self-knowledge and to improve their ability to decide what is required of them, must interpret their practice, to uncover and articulate its meaning or rationale. But as Postema insists, if it is indeed a social practice then it must be assumed to have some rationale to which to some extent all participants subscribe. The question for each is not 'what do our common actions mean to me?' but 'what do they mean to us?' This does not mean, however, that they must all be able to reach agreement in answering that question. Some disagreement is possible as long as there remains a sufficient overlap of experience so that 'the parties [can] recognise that they participate in a common activity and move around in a common world, one which they recognise to be the product of common work'. 177 The notion of a rule of recognition must be readjusted accordingly. A rule of recognition is formulated by interpreting the common practice of legal officials in determining the rules and principles by which they believe they are bound, to articulate its underlying rationale.'78 As Hart puts it, 'in the day-to-day life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very seldom expressly formulated as a rule . . . For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified . . .'179 To formulate a rule of recognition, it is necessary 'to enter into the spirit of the constitution'.180 One must extrapolate from the practices of officials, including their intentions, values and beliefs, as well as their actions, and this is fraught with difficulty. This is true of the officials themselves; they too may fail to formulate with complete accuracy the rationale underlying their activities.
For this reason it is not clear that British judges do in fact accept the rule of unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty. They may say they do, but they may be mistaken: they may be misinterpreting their own practices. Consider the blue-eyed babies Act.181 Judicial endorsements of the rule of unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty imply that were such an Act to be passed, the judges would be bound This is no doubt true of other legal systems in which officials have proclaimed the unlimited sovereignty of their supreme lawmaker. Even in the case of ostensibly absolute monarchs or fuhrers, assertions of their unlimited sovereignty are best understood as being subject to qualifications which are unspoken either because they are overlooked, or because their expression is thought to be unnecessary and impertinent. Submission even to such authorities as these is premised on their representing or serving some aspiration or ideology, and this necessarily limits their room for manoeuvre. 184 If they should act plainly contrary to that aspiration or ideology, they would be disobeyed-which shows that they would be believed to have thereby transgressed implicit limits to their authority. But their followers find this eventuality almost inconceivable, and therefore overlook those limits or see no point in explicitly asserting them. Instead, to emphasize the amplitude of the authority encompassed within, and their faith that their ruler will never violate, those limits, they may say that 'the king can do no wrong'. While perfectly adequate in normal circumstances, this would depend on presuppositions which may remain unspoken or even unnoticed unless exceptional circumstances arise.185 If they do arise subjects tend belatedly to embrace the idea that their ruler's authority was implicitly limited all along. The point is that their re-interpretation of the situation need not be dismissed as a mere rationalization; it reflects a sounder conception of the nature of legal authority than their previous profession of blind allegiance.
182 See text to n 160, above. 183 G. Postema, '"Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices', op cit n 176, 292-3. 184 Lucas, op cit n 180, 28-9. 185 Id, 325-7.
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Authoritative legal institutions help to settle disagreements about what ought to be done. But the establishment and general efficacy of such institutions depends on the existence of a deeper level of agreement, a public morality, which must include agreement as to some substantive values.186 It is both the values included within, and any known to be excluded from,187 this deeper agreement which determine the limits to the de facto authority of legal institutions, whose decisions will be disobeyed if they transgress them. But why should they not also be regarded as setting limits to those institutions' legal authority? Since there is necessarily widespread agreement as to both some substantive values, and the need for the authoritative resolution, consistent with them, of many188 of the matters as to which there is no agreement, the right to deny the validity of any law flouting those values-the blue-eyed babies statute, for example-need not threaten authority more generally.
We can now return to the question of the validity of evil laws. The suggestion which prompted our diversion was that a judge who believes a rule to be evil, and is therefore unable to agree with other judges and officials that it is valid in the full, internal sense, should nevertheless say that it is valid in the detached sense.189 The suggestion was based on the observation that the criteria for legal validity are determined by the common practices of legal officials as a group. But it is now clear that the matter is not as straightforward as this. At least from the internal point of view of officials themselves, it is doubtful that consensus among them is an essential condition for the validity of law. Dworkin has persuasively argued that judges do not believe that there is no law, and no judicial duty to decide one way rather than another, just because there is controversy-even among the judges themselves-as to what law is. 190 Nor do the judges believe that the law is whatever a majority of them decides that it is: dissenting judges necessarily believe that the majority's opinion is wrong.191 Now, if this is true in more familiar cases involving problems of the ambiguity, vagueness or prima-facie inconsistency of rules, why is it not equally true of cases involving the moral criteria upon which-as we have argued-the practice of law and the validity of all rules is ultimately based? The criteria of legal validity may be determined by the common practices of officials, but these are interpretive practices. Disagreement among participants as to the rationale underlying a social practice is possible,192 and none need assume that the view of the majority is necessarily correct. This can be so, at least provided that 186 This point is stressed in id, 19, 33-4, 36-7, 318, 324-5, and 336-8. 187 Even in the case of some substantive values held only by a minority of officials or citizens, if that minority regards them more highly than even the preservation of ordered government, why should it not let it be known that it deems the authority of legal institutions to be limited by them? This need not threaten the authority of those inistitutions provided that they take the warning seriously and act accordingly. 191 'Necessarily' because otherwise they would not dissent. Of course, the principles of stare decisis may require that the majority's decision thenceforth be accepted as correct. But those principles are not absolute and unqualified: the reasons for a judge deferring to a majority decision which he thinks mistaken must be weighed against other reasons for over-ruling it. 192 See the text to n 177, above.
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VOL. 10 disagreement is infrequent and marginal, and does not threaten the efficacy of the practice.193 Moreover, even if some disagreement does threaten the efficacy of the practice, it is not clear that participants must be mistaken in believing that either one side or the other is right. In times of fundamental official dissension, and perhaps even civil war, it may from the external point of view seem obvious either that there are two different and rival legal systems, or that there is no law at all. But the disputants themselves often hold the very different opinion that they are defending the law against unlawful opposition.194 This reflects a conception of law rooted in the notion of rightful-that is, morally legitimate-authority. A judge confronted by a rule he believes to be so evil that it ought not to be applied may not know that this belief is not shared by other judges, although he may suspect as much. He should know that the validity of law depends partly on moral criteria and not solely on social facts. If he believes that the rule does not satisfy those moral criteria, must he not say that in his opinion it is not law? He may hope thereby to persuade his colleagues to follow his example, as in fact they should do if they endorse his moral judgment. They should do so because they too could not sincerely make an internal statement that the rule is valid, and there is no reason to make a detached statement that it is valid unless it is clearly known that the vast majority of officials are of that opinion. The single judge can therefore quite properly express his opinion that the rule is, from the point of view of the legal system as a whole, invalid. If his opinion is authoritatively rejected, or if he knows that it inevitably will be, then by continuing to assert it he may merely confuse and mislead-and unless that is in itself a worthwhile objective, then as Finnis points out there is no good practical purpose in doing so.195 But otherwise there is every reason to assert it, not only because he hopes to persuade others and a claim of legal right is ideologically useful, but because he believes that it is, and it may indeed be, true.
Conclusion
Moral judgments have a greater role to play in legal. reasoning than the foundational thesis acknowledges. It maintains that moral norms provide the ultimate justification for every chain of legal reasoning, but except in hard cases-where they necessarily enter more directly into legal reasoning-need not be explicitly adverted to, because they justify a once-and-for-all judgment that all positive norms of the legal system should be enforced. But it is logically impossible even in otherwise 'easy' cases properly to reach a decision merely by applying positive legal norms: moral norms are directly relevant to the reasoning by which every case is decided. This is because judges are required, legally as well as morally, to refuse to apply positive legal norms if they believe that there are compelling moral reasons for doing so. This is true of both common law, statutory and even constitutional norms.
Sophisticated positivists might resist the threatened collapse of legal positivism into natural law by arguing that the former is a theory of law, and not a theory of adjudication; a theory about the identification rather than the application of legal norms. They might explain the pervasive role of moral judgments in adjudication by attributing to the courts legal powers to change common law and statutory law, which is nevertheless identifiable on the basis of social facts alone. But if such powers extend to every case, then in every case a moral judgment-whether or not to exercise them-must be made, which vitiates the foundational thesis. Worse, by detracting from the authoritativeness of law, this undermines the social thesis as well, by depriving it of its rationale.196 Indeed, we have argued that on Raz's own premises-that practical authority is claimed by the law and is essential to its proper functioning, that this claim is reflected in internal legal statements such as assertions of validity, and that judgments of validity are judgments as to what is law-there can be no distinction between the best theory of law and (the relevant parts of) the best theory of adjudication. 197 Our argument rests on premises accepted by positivists themselves. Positivism set about its own demise when Hart rightly insisted on the intrinsic normativity of law. Raz has rightly insisted that this normativity is moral. By endorsing the view that internal legal statements express moral commitment to the law, Raz has undermined the social thesis and-since it is the most fundamental commitment of positivism198-legal positivism itself, as a participant theory of law. As such, legal positivism has self-destructed. 196 See the text to and following nn 109-10, above. 197 
